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REFLECTIONS ON MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM
CO. V. HUNT 1
HAROLD WRIGHT HOLT

I.

THE BACKGROUND

The reasoning of the Supreme Court in a group of cases that have arisen
under Workmen's Compensation Acts has stirred the interest of students of
Conflict of Laws.2 In the first, Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc., v. Clapper,3
the petitioner was a Vermont corporation, with its principal place of business
in that state, but with power lines extending into 'New Hampshire. In
Vermont it hired Clapper, a citizen and resident of that state, as a lineman
for emergency service in either that' state or New Hampshire. He was killed
in New Hampshire in the -course of his employment. His administratrix
chose to bring an action in a court of New Hampshire to recover damages
for his death father than, to seek compensation under the New Hampshire
Employer's Liability and Workmen's Compensation Act.4 The New Hampshire statute permitted her that election. 5 Under the diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction, the action was removed into the United States District Court
for the District of New Hampshire.
. The Light Company contended that only under the Vermont Workmen's
Compensation Act could it be held civilly liable to give redress for the death
of Clapper. That statute professed to make "exclusive" the remedy providing for an injury suffered outside of Vermont by a workman in the course
of his employment when the employee had been hired in Vermont by a Vermont employer for work outside of the state and the parties to the contract of
employment had agred that the statutory remed should be the only remedy
for any such injury. 6 According to the Vermont Act, Clapper and his employer had so "agreed" because prior to his death neither party to the employment contract had 'filed with the proper authority an express statement
to the contrary.7 Under the circumstances of the case, so the Light Company
I
f
U. S. 430, 64 Sup. Ct. 208 (1943).
1320
2
See Dunlap, The Conflict of Laws and Workmen's Compensation (1935) 23 CALIF. L.
REv. 381; Dwan, Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws-The Restatement
and Other Recent Developments (1935) 20 MINN. L. REv. 19; Notes (1935) 35 CoL. L.
REv. 751, (1939) 39 COL.,L. REv. 1024, (1935)
3286
U. S. 145, 52 Sup. Ct 571 (1932).
4
N. H. PUB. LAWS (1926) c. 178.
5

1d. at § 11.

6VT. GEN. LAWS (1917) c. 241, § 5774.

7Id. at § 5765.

44 YALE L.,J. 869.
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argued, the court in New Hampshire was required to give full faith and credit
to the provisions of the Vermont Act by dismissing the action. This the
District Court refused to do. It held the plaintiff entitled to maintain her
action to recover damages for what was a tort in New Hampshire-Clapper's
wrongful death. Ultimately the plaintiff had a verdict and a judgment for
$4000. The Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit, at first reversed, then
affirmed, the judgment.8 On certiorari the Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals. The majority of the Supreme
Court were of the opinion that a denial of recovery in the New Hampshire
action would not violate the public policy of New Hampshire. True, the legislation of that state did not conform to that of Vermont. This lack of conformity
did not mean that it would contravene the public policy of New Hampshire to
give effect to the Vermont Act.9 New Hampshire's interest in the case was
only "casual." Clapper had not been a resident of that state. He had not
been continuously employed there. Seemingly, he had left no dependent
there. No interest of New Hampshire, it seemed, would be subserved by
burdening its courts with the litigation.10
It seems that'the Supreme Court recognized that it could have rested its
decision on the ground that the Circuit Court of Appeals had reached the
wrong conclusion as to what the public policy of New Hampshire required."
Mr. Justice Brandeis, however, speaking for the majority, had previously
said that full faith and credit did require the court in New Hampshire to
recognize the provision of the Vermont Act (that its remedy should be the
only one available to the injured employee or his representative) as a defense
to the New Hampshire action. 12 The Light Company was not seeking to
enforce a cause of action arising under a Vermont statute.
"A State may, on occasion, decline to enforce a foreign cause of action. In
so doing, it merely denies a remedy, leaving unimpaired the plaintiff's substantive right, so that he is free to enforce it elsewhere. But to refuse. to give
effect to a substantive defense under the applicable law of another State, as
under the circumstances here presented, subjects the defendent to irremedia3
ble liability. This may not be done."'
In a specially concurring opinion Mr. Justice Stone hesitated to say "that
851 F. (2d) 992, 999 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931).
9286 U. S. 145, 161, 162, 52 Sup. Ct. 571, 576, 577 (1932).
'Old. at 162, 52 Sup. Ct. at 577.
"Id. at 161, 52 Sup. Ct. at 576, criticizing the assumption as to public policy of New
Hampshire. Note (1932) 46 H.Av. L. Rtv. 291, 292, 293, n. 7.
12286 U. S. 145, 155-158, 52 Sup. Ct. 571, 574, 575 (1932).
' 3 d. at 160, 52 Sup. Ct. at 576.
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the Constitution projects the authority of the Vermont statute across state
lines into New Hampshire, so that the New Hampshire courts, in fixing the
liability of the employer for a tortious act committed within the state, are
compelled to apply Vermont law instead of their own. The full faith and
credit clause has not hitherto been thought to do more than compel recognition, outside the state, of the operation and effect of its laws upon persons
and events within it.' 1 4

I

I

I

Admittedly, he continued, the "status" of employer-employee had been
created in Vermont by the law of Vermont between ihe Light Company and
Clapper. He was not, however, "prepared to say that that status, voluntarily
continued by employer and employee, and given a locus in New Hampshire
by their presence within the state, may not be regulated there according to
New Hampshire law, or that the legal consequences of acts of the employer
or employee there, which grow out of or affect the status in New Hampshire,
must, by mandate of the Constitution, be either defined or controlled, in
the New Hampshire courts, by the laws of Vermont rather than of New
Hampshire.",15
Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Clapper is noteworthy in that never
before had the Supreme Court, in such clear language, extended to a statute,
quite apart and distinct from a judgment or judicial, proceedings, the duty
to give full faith and credit. Previous cases would warrant the belief that the
Court already had in effect extended the full faith and credit clause to statutes
of certain types.' 6 Prior to this case, however, that belief would have rested
in large part on what the Court had done rather than on what it' had said;
and in some of the cases either the issue of extending full faith and credit to
a statute was not squarely raised or the Court chose not to regard it as so
presented.7I
Conceivably, Vermont could have so worded its Act as to have permitted
the plaintiff an election either to recover Workmen's Compensation in
Vernriont or to proceed under the\ statute of New Hampshire. Then, of
course, full faith and credit would not have required greater effect to be
given the Vermont Act elsewhere than was given it in the courts of Vermont.
Such seems to be the conclusion to be drawn from the second case in the
141d. at 163, 164, 52 Sup. Ct. at 577.
15Id. at 164, 52 Sup. Ct. at 577.
16 See Comment (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 339.
17See Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required for Public Acts (1929) 24 ILL.
L. REv. 383. Cf. Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in
the Field of Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 HARv. L. Rav. 533, 550 et seq.
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8

series, Ohio v. Chittanooga Boiler & Tank Co.'
The third case, Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission,'9 is perhaps the'most interesting. A laborer hired in California for employment in Alaska and there injured in the course of his employment was
held entitled to recovery of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act of California. That state was under no duty to give full faith and
credit to the Workmen's Compensation Act of Alaska, which purported to
give an exclusive remedy for the injury, by recognizing it as a defense to
thelaborer's application for an award under the California Act because,
Prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own
statutes, lawfully enacted. One who challenges that right, because of the
force given to a conflicting statute of another state by the full faith and
credit clause, assumes the burden of showing, upon some rational basis,
that of the conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state are
superior, to those of the forum ....20
In further exposition, Mr. Justice Stone stated that, in the case then before
the Court, "only if it appears that, in the conflict of interests which have
found expression inthe conflicting statutes, the interest of Alaska is superior
to that of California, is there rational basis for denying to the courts of Cali21
fornia the right to apply the law of their own state."
The party contending for the extension, in the California proceeding, of
full faith and credit to the Workmen's Compensation Act of Alaska, had
failed to show any superiority of "governmental interests" in Alaska over
those of California. It is true that in the Clapper case the Court had not
expressly professed to appraise the governmental interests of the two statesVermont and New Hampshire; brat, as Mr.'Justice Stone indicates in the
later case, the decision in the earlier is consistent with the reasoning of the
Court in the later.2 2 The attention of the reader is again directed to the final

sentence of Mr. justice Brandeis' opinion in the earlier case:
We have no occasion to consider whether, if~the injured employee had
been a resident of New Hampshire, or had been continuously employed
there, or had left dependents there, recovery
might validly have been
23
permitted under New Hampshire law.
18289 U. S. 439, 53 Sup. Ct. 663 (1933).
19294
U. S. 532, 55 Sup. Ct. 518
20
d. at 547, 548, 55 Sup. Ct. at
21
1d.
at
549, 55 Sup. Ct. at 524.
22

(1935).
523, 524.

1d. at 548, 549, 55 Sup. Ct. at 524.
23286 U. S.145, 163, 52 Sup. Ct. 571, 577 (1932).
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To repeat, New Hampshire's interest was not substantial, but only
"casual."
After Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Coimnission,
slight opportunity was left for extension of full faith and credit to a Workmen's Compensation Act. If the statute of the forum satisfied the due process
requirements and if the interests of the forum in the case of an applicant
for compensation under its statute were substantial, or at least not "casual,"
seldom would a party contending for the extension of full faith and credit to
the statute of a sister state be able to meet the burden of proving a "superiority of governmental interest" in the sister state. That decision has
been neatly described as a triumph "for the cause of local regulation and
flexibility of venue."24 Nor was the preferred position of the forum in applying its own statute weakened if the statute of the sister state were of the
"exclusive" type, i.e., a statute that purported to make its remedy the only
one available. In Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident
Commission,25 California was held not obligated to give full faith and credit
to a Massachusetts statute of that type. California was under no duty to
recognize the Massachusetts statute as a defense to an application for
compensation under the California Act for an injury received by an employee
in California while temporarily there in the course of his employment. The
Massachusetts residence of the employee, the fact that the contract of employment had been made there and the fact that he was regularly employed there,
were not enough to compel the rendition in California of full faith and credit
to the Massachusetts statute.
The last two cases discussed certainly gave an injured employee a choice
of venue in that they seemed to pernit him to seek compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act of any state that had a substantial number of
"contacts" with his employment. And in fact recovery of compensation under
more than one act was far from uncommon. The amount of an earlier.
26
award or awards was generally credited on the later.
The California cases may have narrowed the field of operation of the
Clapper case as a precedent in conflict of laws situations under Workmen's
Compensation Acts, but they hardly "distinguished away" the earlier case.
Its facts differ materially from those in the California cases. In the Clapper
case the employee had died, leaving no dependent in New Hampshire. In the
24

Note (1935) 35 CoL. L. REv, 751, 761.
25306 U. S. 493, 59 Sup. Ct. 629 (1939).
26
See dissenting opinion of Black, J., in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S.
430, 457, 64 Sup. Ct. 208, 222 (1943).
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California cases he was still living, injured and in need of care in California.
The Clapper case still stands as a landmark in that the Court, in effect, there
told the courts of one state (New Hampshire) that they were under a constitutional duty to dispose of a conflict of laws case in accord with the direction of another state (Vermont) .27
II. THE CASE OE Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt

In the last month of 1943 the Supreme Court radically lessened the chances
for recovery under more than one Workmen's Compensation Act by its decision in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt.28 It appears that Magnolia Petroleum Company employed in Louisiana one Hunt, a resident of that state,
as a laborer in oil well drilling. In the course of his employment he went to
Texas and was injured there. He applied for compensation under the Texas
Workmen's Compensation Act 29 and procured an award against his employer's insurer. Under the Texas statute, when the award became final (as it
did), Hunt had no right at common law or under any statute of Texas
against his employer. 30 After the rendition of the Texas award Hunt sued
his employer, Magnolia Petroleum Company, in a court in Louisiana for
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act of that state. The defendant employer pleaded that the recovery sought was barred as res
adjudicata by the Texas award and that that award was entitled to full faith
and credit. The court overruled that defense and awarded the compensation
allowed by Louisiana's Act, with a deduction, as required by the Louisiana
statute, for the amount'of the Texas payments. The Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed. According to that tribunal, despite the full faith and credit
clause, Louisiana courts were entitled to give effect to the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act even though the injury had occurred in Texas.31
In the United States Supreme Court Mr. Chief Justice Stone speaking for
a majority composed of himself and Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Reed and
Roberts, reasoned that the full faith and credit clause and the federal statute
27
For a contrary opinion, Cheatham, Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt (1944) 44 COL. L. REv. 330, 341, n. 31. Certain
cases seem as hard to "kill" as the proverbial cat. It may yet be found that in spite of
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287,,63 Sup. Ct. 207 (1942) the famous Haddock
case has not been "overruled." See Bingham, Song of Sixpence, Some Comments on
Williams v. North Carolina (1943) 29 CORNELL L. Q. 1 and Holt, The Bones of Haddock

v. Haddock (1943)

41 MIcH. L. REv. 1013.

28320
U. S. 430, 64 Sup. Ct. 208 (1943).
29
Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1936) Title 130, Art. 8306 et seq.
30
1d. at Art. 8306, § 3.
31
Hunt v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 10 So. (2d) 109, 113, 114 (1942).
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implementing it 32 made a distinction between a judgment and a statute in that,
In the case of local law, since each of the states of the Union has constitutional authority to make its own law with respect to persons and
events within its borders, the full faith and credit clause does not ordinarily require it to substitute for its own law the conflicting law of another state, even though that law is of controlling force
33 in the courts of
that state with respect to the same persons and events.
Accordingly, had there been no award in Texas, the cases of Alaska
Packers Association and Pacific Employers Insurance Co. against the Industrial Accident Commission, would have allowed Louisiana to apply its
statute. In neither of those two cases had the injured employee been
awarded compensation when he applied for compensation under the Act of
California. Res adjudicata, therefore, could not have ,been pleaded in the
California proceeding in either dase. Hunt, however, had already received an
award in Texas when he sought compensation in Louisiana.
"But when the employee who has recovered dompensation for his injury
in one state seeks a second recovery in another he may be met by the plea
that full faith and credit requires that his demand, which has become res
34
judicata in one state, must be recognized as such in every other."
It was irrelevant whether or not the Texas award purported to "adjudicate
the rights and duties of the parties, under the Louisiana law or to control
persons and courts in Louisiana" because Texas "is without power to give
extraterritorial effect to its laws ....

35

Pausing for comment, will any one disagree with this last statement?
Hardly. Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court of the United States,
not the Texas courts or the Texas legislature, will decide whether or not
Louisiana courts must dispose of a conflict of laws case involving Workmen's
Compensation in harmony with a direction of the Texas legislature (a statute
or "law" of Texas). And in view of the cases of Alaska Packers Association
and Pacific Employers Insurance Co. against the Industrial Accident Commission of California, one would hardly expect the Court to hold the Texas
32

"And the said records and judicial proceedings, so authenticated, shall have such
faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by
law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are taken." Rav. STAT. § 905
(1878), 28 U. S. C. § 687 (1940). Hereinafter this statute will be referred to as the
"implementing statute." It was not a factor in the earlier cases before the Supreme Court
involving conflict of laws situations under Workmen'§ Compensation Acts.
33320 U. 8. 430, 436, 437, 64 Sup. Ct. 208, 212 (1943).
34
1d. at 437, 64 Sup. Ct. at 212.
35 Id. at 440, 64 Sup. Ct. at 214.
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Workmen's Compensation Act, apart from any award, .a bar to a suit in
Louisiana under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act. Mr. Chief
Justice Stone said as much.
In the Clapper case the Court did in effect rule that New Hampshire courts
should follow a direction indicated in a Vermont statute. But no matter how
clearly Vermont's statute might have forbidden New Hampshire courts to
give any remedy in a case like the Clapper case, New Hampshire as a state,
in the absence of Constitutional provisions, would have been free in its own
courts to disregard the Vermont statute. By virtue of the full faith and credit
clause, the Court directed the New Hampshire courts to allow no action
under the New Hampshire statute for Clapper's death. Why? Because in
Vermont the only remedy available was that provided by the Vermont Workmen's Compensation Act. Because of full faith and credit, the existence of
the Vermont Act leads to an "effect" in New Hampshire so strongly similar
to the effect which the Act has in Vermont that one is justified for most purposes in saying that full faith and credit gives the Vermont Act the "same
effect" in New Hampshire as in Vermont. But Vermont is not giving "extraterritorial effect to its laws." Vermont would not have allowed in its courts
an action based on any wrongful death statute of New Hampshire for the
recovery of damages for Clapper's death. To speak accurately, Vermont
would not have created a "Vermont right" enforceable in Vermont courts
and patterned or modelled upon a "New Hampshire created right" enforceable in New Hampshire courts. Because Vermont and New Hampshire are
states of the Union, the full faith and credit clause rould be invoked. Thereunder, the Court held that it should direct New Hampshire courts to create
no right tinder the New Hampshire statute for the tecovery of damages for
Clapper's death.
So, also, the Supreme Court of the United States, not the Texas courts or
the Texas legislature, will decide whether or not Louisiana courts must make
a certain disposition of a conflict of laws case involving Workmen's Compensation because Texas has made an award. It would seem obvious that Texas
had not undertaken to create a "Texas right' enforceable in Texas and patterned or modelled upon a "Louisiana created right" enforceable in Louisiana.
That is not material. 36 But the Texas legislature had in effect said that once
a final award had been given against the insurer in Texas, there should be
no "Texas right" enforceable in Texas in favor of Hunt against his employer.
Under the full faith and credit clause and the implementing statute, the exist361d. at 440, 441, 64

Sup. Ct. at 214.
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ence in Texas of an award leads to an "effect" in Louisiana so strongly
similar to that obtaining in Texas that one is justified for most purposes in
saying that the Texas award has the "same effect" in Louisiana as in Texas.
But Texas is not giving "extraterritorial effect" to its award. It is the Supreme Court of the United States that gives force to the direction indicated
in the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act and the Texas award-that the
courts of Louisiana should refrain from creating a "Louisiana right" under
the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation .Act.
It is not clear, from the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Stone, whether the
Texas award was to be given under the implementing statute "such faith and
credit" as it had "by law or usage in the courts of" Texas because it was a
"record" or a "judicial proceeding."
Granting that Louisiana bad an interest in awarding compensation to
Louisiana employees injured elsewhere, its interest was overridden by that of
Texas, once Texas had made an award. Said the Chief Justice :37
No convincing reason is advanced for saying that Louisiana has a
greater interest in awarding compensation for-an injury suffered in an
industrial accident, than North Carolina had in determining the marital
status of its domiciliary against whom a divorce decree had been rendered
3
in another state, Williams v. North Carolina,
" or Mississippi in stamping out gambling within its borders, Fauntleroy v. Lure, 39 or South
Carolina in requiring a parent to support his 40child who was domiciled
within that state, Yarborough v. Yarborough.
Concurring with the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Jackson felt that the Court
should reverse the Louisiana judgment so long as Williams v. North Carolina
was not overruled.
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas took the position that Williams v. North
Carolina was not in point. According to him the Texas award when fully
pdid would, under the Texas Act, have discharged the insurer "from all
liability by reason of this claim for compensation."41 Texas had, "under the
most charitable construction," merely undertaken to adjust legal relations
42
of the parties only so long as they remained subject to its jurisdiction.
"If the Texas award had undertaken to adjudicate the rights and duties of
the parties under the Louisiana contract of employment, which we are told37Ibid.

38317 U. S. 287, 63 Sup. Ct. 207 (1942).
39210 U. S.230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641 (1908).
40290 U. S.202, 54 Sup. Ct. 181 (1933).
41320 U. S.430, 448, 64 Sup. Ct. 208, 218 (1943).
42
1d. at 449, 64 Sup. Ct. at 218.
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carries the right to compensation under the Louisiana Act (10 So. 2d 109,
112), the result would be quite different. Then the judgment, like the divorce
decree in the Williams case, would undertake to regulate the relationship of
the parties, or their rights and duties which flow from7 it, as respects their
undertakings in another State. And since Texas would have had jurisdiction
43
over the parties its decree would be a bar to the present action in Louisiana.,
In agreement with Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Black stated that
under the Texas statute the award made in that state against the insurer did
not bar the right of the employee to collect from his employer for the same
injury, the difference between the amount allowed by Texas and the larger
compensation allowed by Louisiana. To the writer it seems that the following language of Mr. Justice Black shows that he so felt, even more strongly
than Mr. Justice Douglas:
The proceeding in this case before the Texas Board was against the
insurer only and the award entered, by its express terms, was limited to a
release of the insurance company from further liability. The liability of
the employer under Louisiana law was not in issue before the Board
and could not have been put in issue. The employer was not a party to
that proceeding; nor was there "privity" between the insurer and the
employer since the insurer's liability did not extend to rights which the
employee might have against his employer under Louisiana law ....
The decision of this Court today, therefore, is tantamount to holding that
Texas intended to extinguish a claim against the employer in a proceeding in which the employer was not a party and the issue of its liability
allowed to be raised, I cannot impute such
under Louisiana law was.not
44
an intention to Texas.
Even if it were to be assumed, said Mr. Justice Black, that Texas did have
such an intention, the interest of Louisiana in regulating the employment
contracts of its residents permitted it to grant as a matter of policy a measure
of compensation larger than was granted in Texas. "The interest of Texas
in providing compensation for an injured employee who like respondent was
only temporarily employed in the state is not the same as that of Louisiana
where respondent was domiciled and where the contract of employment -was
made.... The Louisiana Act was passed in the interest of the general welfare of the people of Louisiana. If it chooses to be more generous to injured
workmen than Texas, no Constitutional issue is presented. '45
So much for a statement of the opinions in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v43Id. at 448, 449, 64 Sup. Ct. at 218.
44
45

d. at 453, 64 Sup. Ct. at 220.

1d. at 456, 64 Sup. Ct. at 221.
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Hunt. It may well be that so long as this decision stands there will be a race
between the injured employee and the employer, or perhaps an insurer of the
employer, to secure an award of compensation in the state which is r~garded
by the winner of the race as having a Workmen's -Compensation Act more
favorable to it than the statute of any other state would be. In this connection
it should be noted that Hunt *had merely tled application for compensation
under the Texas Act when he decided that his interests would be furthered
by suit under the Louisiana statute. He gave notice to that effect to the insurer. Nevertheless,, the Texas Industrial Accident Board proceeded to hold
a hearing without any request from Hunt and gave its award in a proceeding in which Hunt had not participated otherwise than as just described.
Hunt had filed his Louisiana action before the Texas award became final. 46,
Whether or not such a rac6 for an award is a contest that should have judicial
encouragement may be ar interesting subject for speculation, but thi§ paper
will give no further attention to it.
It is interesting that the majority seems to have predicated its decision on
what may be termed Hunt's "voluntary submission to the jurisdiction" of
Texas. 47 In other words, the majority felt that Hunt's conduct sufficed to
justify the Texas Industrial Accident Board in granting an award that would
bind him. The facts may be beyond dispute. Whether or not the conclusion
drawn from the facts by the majority is reasonable may be arguable. What
conduct of Hunt brbught him within the "jurisdiction" of the Texas Industrial Accident Board?
Confined to a hospital he was told that he could not recover compensation unless he signed two forms presehted to him. As found by the
Louisiana trial judge there was printed on each of the forms 'in small
type' the designation 'Industrial Accident Board, Austin, Texas.' To get
his compensation Hunt signed the forms and the Texas insurer began to
pay. Returning to his home in Louisiana Hunt apparently discovered
that his interests would be more fully protected under Louisiana law and
notified the insurer of an' intention to claim under the statute of that
48
state.
46
See
47

dissenting opinion of Black, J., 320 U. S. 430, 450, 64 Sup. Ct. 208, 219 (1943).
"BuJ it does not follow that the employee who has sought and recovered an award of
compensation in either state may then have recourse to the laws and courts of the other
to recover a second or additional award for the same injury." 320 U. S. 430, 437, 64 Sup.
Ct. 208, 213 (1943).
"Respondent was free to pursue his remedy in either state but, having chosen to seek it
in Texas, where the award was res judicata, the full faith and credit clause precludes
him from again seeking a remedy in Louisiana upon the same grounds." Id. at 444, 64
Sup.
4 8 Ct. at 216.
1d. at 450, 64 Sup. Ct. at 219, dissenting opinion of Black, J.
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Subsequent proceedings by the Board were without-any request or participation by Hunt. Before the Texas award had become final, Hunt had
started his action in Louisiana. He declined to accept further payments from
the Texas insurer.
Very little sufficed to bring Hunt within the "jurisdiction" of the Texas
Industrial Accident Board! It is respectfully submitted that the conclusi6n
of the majority as to Hunt's "voluntary submission to the jurisdiction" of
Texas may be an unfortunate precedent. May it not facilitate the execution
of ethically questionable plans to bring an injured employee "within the
jurisdiction" of one particular state?
To the reader there have doubtless Occurred other interesting problems.
At the risk of seeming neglect of them the writer wishes now to point out
what to him is significant in the decision.
III.

ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN

CONFLICT OF LAWS

The decision emphasizes an unwillingness by the Court, increasingly
marked of late, to subsume issues in conflict of laws under due process. In
the majority opinion, Mr. Chief Justice Stone, by implication at least, leads
one to believe that he would not have held that Hunt's recovery under the
Louisiana Act as well as the Texas Act, violated due process because of some
Constitutional policy against recovery under the statutes of more than one
state of compensation for the same injury. It is true that to Mr. Justice
Black the majority seem "in some parts of its opinion to adopt a wholly new
and far reaching policy relating to the power of states to allow complete
indemnification for a personal injury by permitting more than one suit
against the wrongdoer, and to engraft this policy on .to the full faith and
credit clause. Courts schooled in the common law have long objected to what
has been designated 'splitting a cause of action.' They have phrased this
policy objection in many common law concepts, one of which has been the
doctrine of 'election of remedies.' This predilection of common law judges
in favor of compelling the aggregation of all possible elements of damage
into one law suit is here apparently elevated to a position of constitutional
49
impregnability in the full faith and credit clause."
Mr. Justice Black's criticism may be answered by varying the Clapper
case a bit. Suppose that Vermont had had no wrongful death statute and hadc
refused to entertain in her courts any suit for the recovery of damages under
the wrongful death statute of any other state. Suppose, further, that a final
491d. at 460, 461, 64 Sup. Ct. at 223.
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award had been made in Vermont under the'Vermont Workmen's Compensation Act. Undoubtedly that award would have been entitled to recognition in
New Hampshire under the full faith and credit clause and the implementing
statute as a bar to any New Hampshire action for Clapper's death. Vermont
would not have created a "Vermont right" enforceable in the courts of Vermont and patterned or modelled upon a "New Hampshire created right" enforceable in the courts of New Hampshire. The only "Vermont created
right" was that given by the Workmen's Compensation Act of the state. New
Hampshire would have been directed by the United States Supreme Court
not to create under its statute a "New Hampshire right" for Clapper's death.
In Magnolia Petroleum Co., v. Hunt, therefore, the majority of the Court
'did not cut loose from what was reasonably implied in precedent. But the
majority may have been answering Mr. Justice Black's criticism by the
statement that "if the award of compensation in Texas were not res
judicata there, full faith and credit would, of course, be no bar to the recovery of an award in another state.'5 0 It had already stated that under
full faith and credit, Louisiana could not deny the Texas award "the same
binding effect on the parties in Louisiana as it has in Texas."'51 Fuller exposition by the majority of its position on the answer to Mr. Justice Black's
criticism would have been helpful.
One may reasonably disagree with Mr. Justice Black's bpinion that the
majority have established a "drastic new Constitutional doctrine" involving
as a "practical result" the rendition by State B (Louisiana) of "more faith
and credit to State A's judgment for damages for personal injury than State
52
A itself intended the judgment should be given."
At this point it mpay be noted that the majority of the Court does not consider whether or not the Texas legislature acted wisely in making its Workmen s Compensation remedy "exclusive" of any other redress against the employer. That question was not discussed. Nowhere in the majority opinion is
there any indication as to what the Justices would hold as "sound" or juridically "correct", conflict of laws principles which would dictate or justify the expediency of the Texas legislation. Conceivably Texas could have framed its
Workmen's Compensation Act so as to exclude from its scope the case of a
workman resident in Louisiana and hired under a contract of employment
entered into there, even though he received in Texas, in the course of his
50

d. at 443, 64 Sup. Ct. at 215.

1
5
5 2 Id.at 440, 64 Sup. Ct. at 214..
1d. at 461, 64 Sup. Ct. at 223.
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employment, an injury. The exclusion might have been conditioned upon the
existence of a Workmen's Compensation Act in Louisiana (or some other
state) applicable to such workman. Or the exclusion could have been absolute. Nowhere in the opinion of the Chief Justice or in the opinions of any
of the other Justices do we find any statement to indicate that the Court
would have felt such exclusion desirable. The attitude of the majority brings
53
to mind a case not mentioned in any of the opinions-Kryger v. Wilson.
In the Kryger case a contract was made in Minnesota for the sale of a
tract of North Dakota land to D, a resident of Minnesota. Payment was to be
in installments and seemingly the installments were to be paid in Minnesota
and final papers were to be passed there. The buyer defaulted and the seller
cancelled the contract in accord with formalities prescribed by the statute of
North Dakota and sold the tract to the plaintiff who brought suit in North
Dakota to quiet title against D. D defended and asked for counter-relief on
the ground that action prescribed by a Minnesota statute for the cancellation
of a contract for the sale of land had not been taken. The court held that the
North Dakota statute governed, that under it the contract had been duly cancelled and that title should be quieted in the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of
North Dakota affirmed. On writ of error the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the North Dakota decree, holding that there had been no denial of
due process because the court in North Dakota had had jurisdiction both of
the subject matter and of the parties, saying:
The most that the plaintiff in error can say is that the state court made
a mistaken application of doctrines of the conflict of laws in deciding that
the cancellation of a land contract is governed by the law of the situs
instead of the place of making and performance. But that, being purely a
question of local common law, is a matter with which this court is not
concerned .... 51
In Kryger v. Wilson it might have been contended that full faith and
credit must be accorded the Minnesota statute by the courts of North Dakota.
No such contention, however, was made. The courts of North Dakota may
not have made a "sound" choice, from the point, of view of students of
conflict of laws, in selecting the North Dakota statute rather than that of
Minnesota to prescribe the formalities to be observed for cancellation of a
contract for the sale of North Dakota land.5 5 The error, if any, was that of
53242 U. S.171, 37 Sup. Ct. 34 (1916).
54
1d. at 176, 37 Sup. Ct. at 35.

55For an opinion that the North Dakota courts had applied the correct conflict of laws
rule in the view of the Supreme Court, see Note (1935) 35 CoL. L. Ray. 751, 753, n. 12.
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the courts. It was not a "mistake" committed by the legislature of the state.
That body had not undertaken to deal with a conflict of laws problem. But
any error of the North Dakota courts in its choice of law was not to be corrected by subsuming it under denial of due process.
According to the majority decision of the Supreme Court in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt the Texas legislature, had undertaken to deal with a conflict of laws problem. As has been pointed out, the majority did not concern
itself with the wisdom or expediency of the Texas legislation. The majority
may have felt that the Texas legislature had made "a mistaken application of
doctrines of conflict of laws" in bringing a workman like Hunt within the
scope of its Workmen's Compensation Act. But any such misapplication will
not militate against the extension of full faith and credit to an award made
under the statute passed by the "misapplying" legislature.
It may well be that a state, F-i, is not at liberty to deny full faith and
credit to a money judgment of a sister state, F-2, even though the F22 court
in rendering the judgment may have failed to give the recognition to a
statute of F-1 which the Supreme Court may have felt could, or perhaps
should, have been given. As evidence one need only cite Fauntleroy v.
56
Lure
and Roche v. McDonald.57 In both of those cases it was the courts in
F-2 that failed to regard the interest of F-i, in the transaction on which the
particular litigation in F-2 was based, as controlling or even influencing the
decision to be reached in F-2. In both those cases the interest of F-1 was
set forth in statutes. In both cases the F-2 courts may have misapplied the
"doctrines of the conflict of laws." In Kryger v. Wilson it was the court in
North Dakota that may have made a similar failure as. to the interest of
Minnesota; and one nay safely venture the opinion that Minnesota would
have been required to give full faith and credit to the North Dakota decree.58
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt follows a parallel road in holding that
Louisiana (F-1) must give full faith and credit to a judgment of Texas (F-2)
even though it is the Texas legislature, rather than any aberrant Texas court,
that by failure to give due recognition to the interest of a state other than
Texas, deprives the court of Louisiana of any power to implement its policy
in regard to a transaction in which undoubtedly that state had a substantial
interest.
In short, the Supreme Court seems committed to compelling the extension
56210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641 (1908).
57275
U. S. 449, 48 Sup. Ct. 142 (1928).
5
SEspecially if the Supreme Court were to hold that North Dakota had applied the
"correct" conflict of laws rule.
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of full -faith and credit to a money judgment "(or the equivalent of a money
judgment, i.e., certain administrative "awards" or "records") rendered by
F-2, a state court, with, of course, the requisite jurisdiction over parties and
subject matter. 59 Seemingly another forum, F-I, is not to be allowed to deny
full faith and credit in order to implement its own local policy merely because
the judicial reasoning in F-2 or the legislative reasoning in F-2 may not have
led to a selection of what to the Court might seem" the best of the alternatives
in the field of conflict of laws. Only when the choice was dearly unreasonable, will F-1 be allowed to refuse to give recognition to the judgment. And
then it will probably be vulnerable under the due process clause.
There have been occasions, even since Kryger v. Wilson, when the Court
seemed to make itself the final arbiter of what should be the principles of conflict of laws to be followed by the legislatures of the states. 60 Over a period
of years the Court handed down a series of decisions which, in effect, told
the states how a proper system of conflict of laws, in the light of the due
process clause, allotted the power to tax the succession to the interest of a
stockholder in a corporation, 6' to state and municipal bonds, 62 to United
States bonds, 63 to bank credits and promissory notes, 6 4 and to open and unsecured accounts,6 5 or the power to tax intangibles, such as stocks and bonds,
held in trust.66 Perhaps some or all of these decisions were deviations "from
unbroken legal history and fiscal practice." 67 However that may be, more
recent decisions seem to be sweeping them into the discard. 68 In permitting
59

See statement of Stone, C. J., in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430,

438,
6 0 64 Sup. Ct. 208, 213 (1943).

As to the occasionalness of this attitude, see opinion of Stone, J. in Curry v.

McCanless,
307 U. S.357, 363, 59 Sup. Ct. 900, 903 (1939).
1

66 2First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 174 (1932).
Farmers Loan & Trust C6. v. Mifinesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (1930), overruling Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1903).
3
6 Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (1930).
64Ibd.
65
Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U. S. 1, 51 Sup. Ct. 54, (1930).
66Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59 (1929).
67See opinion of Frankfurter, J.,in State Tax Commission v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174,
183, 62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 1012 (1942). Cf. Note (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1398, 1399-1400.
6SAs to succession taxes on shares of corporate stock, see State Tax Commission v.
Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174, 62 Sup. Ct. 1008 (1942); as to succession taxes on interests in.
intangibles held in trust: Stewart v. Pennsylvania, 312 U. S. 649, 61 Sup. Ct. 445 (1941)
and Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 900 (1939) ; Cf. Graves v. Elliott,
307 U. S. 383, 59 Sup. CC 913 (1939). As to taxation of income received in one state by
beneficiary of 'trust when another state has collected a tax on income received by the
trustee, see Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U. S. 19, 59 Sup. Ct. 1 (1938), in which
the Court relied on Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U. S. 276, 52 Sup. Ct. 556
(1932) and New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 57 Sup. Ct. 466 (1937).
See also, Note (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1398.
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in effect what is commonly called "multiple taxation" by two or more states,
by ruling that thereby no violation of due process is involved, the Court is
allowing state legislatures wide opportunity to work out and apply novel
theories in that part .of conflict of laws generally marked in casebooks and
digests with some such subhead as "Jurisdiction to tax. ' 69 A similar develop7
ment may be taking place with respect to state regulation of insurance. 0
Other examples could be given, but lack of space prevents. Enough has been
said by way of illustration.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, at first glance, seems to be merely an
instance'of a rigid application of the full faith and credit clause and the implementing statute. It is more than that. The decision is another illustration of
the liberty that is being given states ,to embody their own views of conflict of
laws in legislation. Thanks to the insistence upon a strict application of full
faith and credit to "records" and "judicial proceedings," Texas is able to
force its view of the proper treatment of a conflict of laws situation in Workmen's Compensation on Louisiana through the agency of the Supreme Court.
In effect, the position of the majority of the Court is not unlike that of the
members for whom Mr. Justice Brandeis' spoke in the Clapper case. In
neither the Clapper case nor the Magnolia Petroleum.Co.'case is any inquiry
made by the Court into the wisdom or expediency of the view of conflict of
laws in Workmen's Compensation taken by the legislature of the state which
succeeds in monopolizing the giving of relief for an injury (fatal in the one
case, not fatal in the other) to a workman. The Alaska Packers Association
and Pacific Employers Insurance Co. cases had indicated the improbability
of any state's acquiring such control.
We cannot be so sure now.
I

'IV.

THE MATTEI OF PRIVITY

One more point deserves consideration. Mr. Justice Black, we have seen,
could not agree that the Texas award against thw insurer was res adjudicata
of the claim of Hunt against his employer under the Louisiana Act.71 The
employer will probably not object to the decision of the majority. Hunt and
69
"The Constitution is not a formulary. It does not demand of states strict observance
of rigid categories nor precision of technical phrasing in their exercise of the most basic
power of government, that of taxation...." Frankfurter, J., in Wisconsin v. J. C.
Penney Co., 311 U. S.435, 444, 61 Sup. Ct. 246, 249 (1940). See also, his opinion in
Newark Fire Insurance Co. v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 307 U. S.313, 323, 324, 59
Sup.
Ct 918, 922 (1939) ; and Note (1941) 50 YALE L. J.900.
70
Holmes v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 311 U. S.606, 61 Sup. Ct. 14 (1941);
Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U. S.53, 60 Sup, Ct. 758 (1940).
71320 U. S.430, 451-455, 64 Sup. Ct. 208, 219-221 (1943).
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the insurer were parties to the Texas proceeding. It need not cause surprise
that the majority should have held that an award against the insurer was
res adjudicataas to the claim against the employer.
In Kryger v. Wilson, it was the grantee of the vendor in the contract of
sale who brought suit in North Dakota. The vendor was not a party to the
suit to quiet title. The defendant was the 'vendee in the original contract of
sale. He was a resident of Minnesota who voluntarily "submitted to the
jurisdiction" of the North Dakota court. If he had not, "the decree could
have determined only the title to the land, and would have left him free to
assert any personal rights he may have had under the contract. But, having
come into court and specifically asked in his cross bill that he be declared entitled to the 'possession and control of the real estate described in the complaint herein under a contract of sale,' he cannot now complain if he has been
'72
concluded altogether in the premises.
What the Court had in mind is not clear. It would seem as if it had in
mind rights against the vendor in the original contract of sale for damages for
breach of contract when it speaks of "personal rights ...

under the contract."

If the North Dakota decree in Kryger v. Wilson not only determined that
the defendant had no title to the land in that state, but also cut off any right
in personam he might have had in any other state against the vendor, who
was not a party to the suit, is one's sense of fair play, i.e., "due process,"
shocked by having the Texas award against the insurer cut off Hunt's rights
against his employer, who was not a party to the Texas proceedings? Just
as the defendant in Kryger v. Wilson sought relief under the law of North
Dakota, so did Hunt in the principal case seek relief under the law of Texas.
True, the defendant in Kryger v. Wilson pushed his claim further in North
Dakota than Hunt did in Texas. Both, however, are considered to have
made themselves parties to proceedings voluntarily, one in North Dakota, the
other in Texas.
Again, suppose that C has a claim against D and D has a claim for money
(a debt) against G. G is a citizen and resident of State F-1, D of F-2. At the
suit of 'C the F-1 court has jurisdiction to garnish D's claim against G in
satisfaction of C's claim against D. It is enough if service of process is made
in F-1 on G. The judgment in garnishment against G at the suit of C must be
given full faith and credit in the court of any other state in which D may
later seek to recover judgment against G, on his claim. This is so even though
D was never subject to the jurisdiction of the court in F-i. 73
72242 U. S. 171, 177, 37 Sup. Ct. 34, 35 (1916).
73
Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625 (1904).
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Whatever may be the reasoning used to justify the grant of full faith and
credit to F-ls judgment against G in favor of C, when D was not personally
subject to the jurisdiction of F-i, fully as sound reasons could be found to
justify the cutting off of Hunt's claim against his employer in Louisiana because of the Texas award.
The words "privies" and "privity" are used by courts merely as statements
of conclusions. If a court feels that a person not personally a party to a
judgment should be bound by, or entitled to the benefits of, that judgment for
certain purposes, it will, with or without a statement of the reasons why it
so feels, find that he is a "privy" to or "in privity with" one or the other of
the parties to the judgment. 4 A thorough discussion of the situations when
such findings will be made is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say
that so far as the problem of privity is tied up with the extension of full faith
and credit to state judginents in this country, the United States Supreme
Court must often have the final-decision as to when "privity" is to be found
to exist.
74R~sTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942)
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